与巴菲特共进晚餐：无论何时他都能指引我的投资行为

Graham

　　   12月13日，星期天，我和朋友菲尔•德姆斯（Phil DeMuth）乘飞机来到异常寒冷的奥马哈市，准备第二天同投资大师沃伦•E•巴菲特（Warren E. Buffett）共进晚餐。第二天，天气更冷了，但沃伦仍像以往一样热情亲切，来到他位于闹市区的伯克希尔•哈撒韦公司（Berkshire Hathaway）老派庄严的办公室门口迎接我们。由于篇幅有限，我就直接切入正题了。
　　   我首先注意到，他办公室的样子和我前几年看到的稍有不同。现在这儿到处都是火车模型，标志着他最近对伯灵顿北方圣太菲铁路运输公司（Burlington Northern Santa Fe）的收购——这些礼物送得好，因为收集火车模型是沃伦自儿时起就有的爱好。菲尔带给他一份19世纪30年代的莱诺（Lionel）火车模型目录，沃伦看得饶有兴致，莱诺火车对于巴菲特，就像“玫瑰花蕾”对《公民凯恩》中的男主角一样，都是源于某种童年情结。
　　   我问他，为什么收购伯灵顿北方公司是单好生意，他的回答是典型巴菲特式的……其中列举了好多数字。他解释说，伯克希尔已经做得非常大了，即使是一次非常成功的小型收购也几乎不会影响公司的收入。
　　   不过，比较成功的大型收购对公司业绩的贡献就大得多了。（他又快速地罗列数字做出解释，仿佛进行分析的是一台计算机，不过从某种程度上说，巴菲特的脑子和电脑不相上下。他对付数字是如此熟练和得心应手，几乎有点可怕了。）
　　   我们共进晚餐是在皮考罗•皮特饭店（Piccolo Pete's），一家位于工薪阶层社区的意大利餐馆，为了招呼巴菲特，工作人员似乎把其他客人都撇在了一边。席间，巴菲特谈到去年秋天经济的确非常糟糕。
　　   他说，挽救局面的是肯•刘易斯（Ken Lewis）——饱受攻击的美洲银行（Bank of America）首席执行官。在雷曼公司分崩离析之时，他收购美林公司，增强人们对经济体系的信心，并且阻止了——或者说强有力地协助阻止了——“挤兑银行”现象的发生，这种状况一旦出现，将会对整个华尔街造成灾难性影响。
　　   巴菲特说，一旦美林垮掉，摩根也会随之崩溃（Morgan），紧接着就是高盛。通过高价购买美林，刘易斯实际上避免了整个美国陷入金融崩溃。
　　   如果没有这项收购，商业发展将会停滞，并且难以恢复，而银行本不充裕的资金将会陷于债务泥潭。
　　   巴菲特说，他还没有看到自己公司出现复苏的迹象，至少没有足够多的迹象。房产和建设业发展缓慢，货物运输也不景气，在奥马哈，这个几乎没有受到失业影响的城市，珠宝和家具的销售业绩也令人失望。
　　   不过，巴菲特认为，这并不足以让我们怀疑股市将在2009年回暖。他注意到，二战之后道琼斯指数最大幅度的上升出现在1954年，当时，失业率相当高（虽然远没有糟糕到今天这种程度），当年年末才有所好转，同时，快速的复苏也开始了。
　　   同样的事情也会发生在今天，他说。（像往常一样，我之后查看了资料，巴菲特关于1953-54年间的经济发展放缓和复苏的说法是正确的。）
　　   巴菲特对高盛（Goldman Sachs）的看法多是正面的赞扬，而这个公司常常是我批评的对象。他说，这家公司能获得如此惊人的收入是因为现在没有几家银行能够进行规模庞大的交易，因此，高盛如今能够获得比前几年更好的发展。
　　   而且，巴菲特说，高盛擅长对冲交易，并且态度谨慎。他举例说，高盛购买了针对伯克希尔拥有的大量股市看跌期权的信用违约互换，这些看跌期权虽然要多年之后才会到期，但现在已经陷入困境，自巴菲特将其出售后，股价已经跌落不少。
　　   在2008年最黑暗的那些日子里，这些信用违约互换的价值飙升，因为大家担心等期权到期之时，巴菲特最终将无法履行伯克希尔的承诺。巴菲特指出，这样的状况是绝不会发生的，并建议高盛出售这些信用违约互换，以换取高额利润，但是，巴菲特接着说，高盛却抓住这项对冲投资不放，仿佛既钦佩巴菲特的举动，又觉得有趣。 （当然，伯克希尔•哈撒韦是高盛的大股东）
　　   巴菲特讲过很多童年时的故事，讲他如何在华盛顿特区的春谷和韦斯利高地两个富人区送报纸。他说，1943年的时候，他可以眨眼的工夫就在腿上折好一份报纸，再精确地扔到新墨西哥路旁公寓的门口。“我现在还能做到.”他补充道。
　　   他还说到了在切维切斯俱乐部当球僮，抬着两个大包走完54个高尔夫球洞的事情。“我是年纪最小，看起来最可怜的球僮，”他说，“所以其他球僮同情我，没有对我大打出手。”他说当球僮实在太辛苦，他只做了一天。这肯定是他唯一半途而废的事情。
　　   巴菲特认为劳动力市场短期内还不会好转。不过，他建议年轻人“追随自身激情所在”，从事自己热爱的工作。如果这项工作无法谋生，就继续去尝试其他事情。
　　   总统奥巴马对巴菲特评价很高，尽管巴菲特的祖父曾说过民主党的坏话，说人们应该警惕民主党人和那些不付帐单的人。（巴菲特的祖父是一名成功的杂货店主，而巴菲特的父亲也作出过颇多成就，曾担任三届共和党议员。）然而，巴菲特非常担心核扩散问题，尤其担心恐怖组织和伊朗获得核武器。
　　   这顿晚餐的好大一部分时间，我们都在谈论恐怖分子可能如何对美国民众造成大规模的伤害。这个问题我在这里就不说了，不过我们很是担忧。（如果我母亲在来世能读到这篇文章，我想告诉她，巴菲特是我见过的唯一一个在食物里放盐放得比我还多很多的人。）
　　   现在，说说大家真正关心的话题，巴菲特认为对普通的非职业投资者来说，混合型指数基金仍然行得通。对职业投资者来说，他支持自己导师本•格雷厄姆 （Ben Graham）的观点，即在价值上做文章，寻找那些价值远高于你出价的交易。
　　   我当时没有问一个更需智慧的问题，即如何在一个不断变化的世界里界定价值。我们都认为，利率将会回升，尽管我们不知道是什么时候，会上升多少（这是当然的）。
　　   和大家一样，巴菲特也不理解为什么日本会有如此高的赤字，如此庞大的债务，却没有出现通货膨胀，利率又很低。他认为，相似的事情显然也可发生在美国，我们也同意他这一观点（在我们谈话的时候，本周的生产价格还没有公布，但这些数字是令人堪忧的）。
　　   我们谈到了天才经济学家保罗•萨缪尔森（Paul Samuelson）的逝世，谈到了他虽然提倡有效市场理论，却仍一直持有伯克希尔的股票。（当时，我还不知道我一生的师长、导师和朋友，另一位伟大的经济学家,哥伦比亚大学的罗威尔•哈里斯就在我们谈话的同一天去世了。愿你安息，我的朋友。）
　　   晚饭后，夜晚的空气变得格外冷。巴菲特尽管聪明绝顶，却不知道如何打开他妻子的福特SUV挡风玻璃除霜器。这时候，我可以说是救了他一命，因为玻璃正在迅速结冰，而路面很滑，我及时地告诉他如何打开了除霜器。
　　   总之，那一晚令我难以忘怀。我能想起的可与之媲美的恐怕只有同弥尔顿•弗里德曼或是我父亲共渡的时光了。他是一个令人难忘的人，一个天才、政治家、绅士。无论何时，他都能指引我的投资行为。
　　   Sunday, December 13, my pal Phil DeMuth and I flew into an unbelievably cold Omaha to meet and eat the next day with the maestro, Warren E. Buffett. The next day was even colder, but Warren greeted us in his trademark folksy manner at the door to Berkshire Hathaway's old fashioned, but solid, offices in downtown Omaha. I know that space is limited so I will get right to what went on.
　　   First, his office had changed a little bit since I was there a couple of years ago. He now has model trains everywhere, emblematic of his recent buy of Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNI, Fortune 500) -- apt gifts, because Warren has been a model train collector since his childhood. Phil had brought him a 1930s Lionel catalog, which Warren read eagerly, Citizen Buffett with his Lionel trains Rosebud.
　　   I asked him why he thought Burlington Northern was such a great buy and he answered in characteristic fashion...with numbers. He explained that Berkshire (BRK.A) had gotten so big that even a very successful small purchase would hardly affect earnings at all.
　　   But a medium successful large purchase would be more helpful. (He explained this with numbers in such a rapid fashion that it was as if a computer were spitting out the analysis, which, in a way, it was. He is so astonishingly facile with numbers that it is almost eerie.)
　　   Over dinner at the amazing Piccolo Pete's, the Italian restaurant in a working class neighborhood that seems to set aside most of the restaurant just for him, he said the economy had really been in desperate shape last fall.
　　   The man who saved it, he said, was Ken Lewis, beleaguered head of Bank of America (BAC, Fortune 500). By buying Merrill Lynch just as everything at Lehman was falling apart, he put some confidence back into the system and stopped -- or helped mightily to stop -- a "run on the bank" which would have laid waste all of Wall Street.
　　   If Merrill had failed, said Buffett, it would have been followed swiftly by Morgan (MS, Fortune 500) and then by Goldman. By overpaying wildly for Merrill, Lewis essentially saved the nation from financial collapse.
　　   Without that buy, commercial paper would have simply stopped dead and the banks' slender capital would have been swamped by debt as that commercial paper could not be rolled over.
　　   Buffett said he did not see signs, or at least not many signs, of recovery at his companies. The entities making home and construction projects were still slow, freight-car loadings were weak, and even in Omaha, a city hardly affected by unemployment, sales of jewelry and furniture were disappointing.
　　   This, however, said Buffett, was not a reason to doubt the stock market's 2009 comeback. Buffett noted that the biggest gain the Dow had ever notched in the postwar period came in 1954 when, according to him, the unemployment numbers were dismal (although nowhere near as bad as today's) until late in the year, when a rapid recovery began.
　　   The same thing could be happening now, he said. (I checked this later and as usual, Buffett had it right about the recovery from the 1953-54 slowdown.)
　　   Buffett had mostly praise for Goldman Sachs (GS, Fortune 500), a frequent object of my criticism. The firm gets its huge income, he said, because there are so few banks presently available to make immense trades, and therefore it can get bigger spreads than it could have a couple of years ago.
　　   Plus, he said, it was extremely good and careful about hedging. He used examples of Goldman's buying credit default swaps on Berkshire's immense puts on the stock market, which are not due to mature for many years but so far are in the red as the stock market has lost so much value since Buffett sold the puts.
　　   These swaps soared in value in the darkest days of 2008, on fear that Buffett would not ultimately be able to meet Berkshire's obligations when the puts came due. Buffett said there was zero chance of that and advised Goldman to sell the credit default swaps at a major profit. But Goldman strictly held onto the hedge, he noted, with what seemed to me a mixture of admiration and amusement. (Berkshire Hathaway, of course, is a large holder of Goldman Sachs.)
　　   Buffett told many stories of his childhood delivering newspapers in Spring Valley and Wesley Heights, two exclusive neighborhoods in Washington, D.C. He said he could almost instantly fold up a newspaper against his thigh and with one hand throw it exactly against the right door of apartments off New Mexico Avenue in 1943. He added, "And I still could."
　　   He also spoke of his caddying at the ultra tony Chevy Chase Club, carrying two bags for 54 holes. "I was the smallest and most pitiful looking caddy," he said, "so the other caddies took pity on me and didn't beat me up." He said it was too exhausting, and he did it only one day. It surely must be the only thing he ever gave up on.
　　   Buffett said that he did not see a good labor market for some time to come. Nevertheless, he said, he advised young people to "follow their passion" and do what they loved. If that did not provide a living, they should try something else.
　　   President Obama still rates high with Buffett, despite his grandfather's warnings about Democrats and people who don't pay their grocery bills. (Buffett's grandfather was a successful grocer and his father, among other achievements, was a three-term GOP congressman.) However, Buffett is extremely worried about nuclear proliferation, especially to terrorist groups and to Iran.
　　   We all spent a good part of the dinner discussing ways the terrorists might greatly diminish life in this country. I won't share these thoughts, but they are grim. (If my mother can read this from the afterlife, Buffett is the only human being I have ever met who puts FAR more salt on his food than I do.)
　　   Now, for what you really wanted to know, Buffett thinks that for the ordinary, non-professional investor, a broad index fund still makes sense. For the professional, he still follows the advice of his mentor, Ben Graham, to look for value plays, where what you pay for a company is clearly less than it is worth.
　　   I did not have the wit to ask him how one defined value in a constantly shifting world. We all agreed that interest rates would change towards the upside at some point, although we did not know when or by how much (of course).
　　   Buffett, like everyone else, is mystified by the Japanese example of super high deficits, a huge national debt, and no inflation and ultra-low interest rates. Something like that is apparently happening here, he suggested, which we would all agree is true (although this week's producer prices number was worrisome and had not come out as of our dinner). But why it is happening now and did not happen in the past (there was inflation between 1933 and 1937, in a far worse economic environment), no one knew.
　　   We talked about the death of Paul Samuelson, the genius economist, and how he had been a longtime BRK stockholder even as he preached efficient market theory. (I did not know at the time that one of the economic greats, Lowell Harriss, my long-time teacher, mentor, and friend, from Columbia, had died the same day as our dinner. R.I.P., dear friend.)
　　   The night air after dinner was brutally cold. Buffett, while still the smartest of the smart, did not seem to know how to turn on the windshield defroster in his wife's Ford SUV and I think I may say I saved his life by showing him how to do it, since the windshield was rapidly icing over and the roads were slick.
　　   Anyway, it was a dazzling evening. The only ready comparisons that come to mind are time spent with Milton Friedman and time spent with my father. A deeply, deeply impressive genius, statesman, and gentleman. He can caddy my investments anytime.
　　（作者: Ben Stein    时间: 2009年12月22日    来源: 财富中文网）